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NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioner appeals from the trial court's order denying post-conviction relief and 
transferring the petition to Third District Court to handle the part of the petition dealing 
with the Board of Pardons & Parole.1 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Given that Stack did not take a direct appeal from his criminal conviction 
nor allege any unusual circumstance for failure to take that appeal, did the post-conviction 
court correctly hold that collateral attack was procedurally barred? 
1
 After reviewing the record, respondents conclude that Stack's appeal should 
be in the Utah Supreme Court since his conviction was for a first-degree felony. Along 
with this brief, respondents have filed a motion for transfer on that point. 
1 
On review of a courts decision to dismiss a petition for extraordinary relief, this 
Court gives no deference to conclusions of law, but reviews them for correctness. Julian 
v. State, 349 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20 (Utah 1998). This Court does defer, however, to trial 
court factual findings, such as the implicit finding regarding Stack's failure to file a direct 
appeal. MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995) (factual findings reversed only 
if "against the clear weight of the evidence"). Further, this Court "survey[s] the record in 
the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and ... will not reverse if there is a 
reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ 
should be granted." Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988) (quoting Velasquez 
v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 232, 443 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1968)). 
2. Did the post-conviction court correctly transfer portions of the petition 
challenging Board actions to the Third District Court. This Court reviews for correctness 
the post-conviction court's decision that the law required transfer of certain parts of the 
petition to Third District Court for review. Webb v. VanDerVeur, 853 P.2d 898, 899 
(UtahApp. 1993). 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
There are no provisions especially relevant to this case that need to be duplicated 
for this brief. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 4, 1979, based on a guilty plea, Judge Don V. Tibbs sentenced 
Stack to an indeterminate term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison for first degree 
murder (R. 654). He did not appeal this conviction (R. 651). Eighteen years later, Stack 
filed this petition, which both challenged his conviction and requested extraordinary relief 
against the Board of Pardons & Parole (R. 1-9; addendum A). Stack's post-conviction 
claim is that his plea was based on an assurance from counsel in his criminal case that he 
would only serve 15 to 25 years in prison. He now argues that the plea bargain was based 
on a misrepresentation because the Board of Pardons & Parole will not release him until 
2014 at the earliest (R. 4). 
The post-conviction court denied Stack's collateral attack, ruling that his challenge 
was barred because he could have and should have taken a direct appeal (R. 651). The 
court held that Stack alleged no unusual circumstances which would have excused that 
appeal; therefore, his right to attack his conviction was waived (Id). The post-conviction 
court transferred the rest of the petition to the Third District Court because that court was 
the correct venue for allegations against the Board (R. 652). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Failure to take a direct appeal precludes post-conviction relief: Stack 
admittedly did not take a direct appeal from his conviction. Because of this admission, 
and his failure to allege any unusual circumstances, the challenge was correctly rejected. 
3 
Transfer to Third District Court was appropriate: Because Stack's petition 
also challenges Board of Pardons & Parole decisions, the post-conviction court correctly 
transferred it to the Third District Court. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
In his brief, Stack appears to waive any argument he has to the post-conviction 
court's order dismissing the challenge to his conviction. He states that the court and the 
respondents misread his petitition. He claims that his only attack was against the Board, 
not against his conviction and that the post-conviction court should have allowed him to 
amend his petition to clarify the focus of attack. Brief of Petitioner at 3-4. 
Given the post-conviction court's order transferring Board-related challenges to 
Third District Court, it is hard to understand Stack's concern. Surely the court could have 
allowed amendment of the petition. Instead, it dealt with an issue it legitimately believed 
was before it, i.e., a post-conviction attack,2 and transferred the rest of the petition to the 
court with proper venue over Board of Pardons' claims. The court did not dismiss the 
parts of the petition Stack claims are most important to him, i.e., relating to the Board of 
Pardons & Parole. Those will merely be in a different court. Consequently, issues 
2
 The petition on page 2 says: MThis guilty plea came from the belief that I 
would do 15 to 25 years in prison.... This assumption was based on my lawyers 
assurances, and the judge's speech during commitment and sentencing phase" (R. 2; 
addendum A). 
4 
relating to the Board's decisions are not before this Court as they have yet to be heard by 
any trial court. In any event, by failing to brief the post-conviction court's order 
regarding the 1979 conviction and procedural bar, Stack has waived that claim. 
American Towers Ass'n Inc. v. CCIMechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996) ("Issues 
not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and abandoned.") 
I. STACK DID NOT APPEAL HIS CONVICTION OR 
SHOW UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES FOR NOT 
APPEALING; CONSEQUENTLY, THE POST-
CONVICTION COURT PROPERLY DENIED HIS 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF. 
Even assuming that Stack has not waived any attack on the post-conviction court's 
order, the decision denying relief was proper. The post-conviction court interpreted 
Stack's petition as including a challenge to his guilty plea, conviction, and sentence. 
Stack's failure to appeal his conviction, however, mandated rejection of that challenge 
and dismissal of that part of the petition 3(R. 651). Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 
(Utah 1994) ("Issues that could and should have been raised on direct appeal, but were 
not, may not properly be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding absent unusual 
circumstances."). Stack has not alleged unusual circumstances and, therefore, any 
challenge to his sentence was correctly rejected. 
3
 Because Stack pled guilty to first degree murder, the method of appeal is 
unique. He would first have to move to withdraw his plea of guilt in the criminal trial 
court and then, if that motion were denied, appeal the denial of the motion to withdraw. 
See State v. Morello, 927 P.2d 641 (Utah App. 1996). Stack has attempted none of these 
things. 
5 
II. UNDER COURT RULES, THE POST-CONVICTION 
COURT HAD TO TRANSFER CLAIMS REGARDING 
THE BOARD TO THE DISTRICT COURT WHERE 
THE PETITIONER RESIDES; THEREFORE, 
TRANSFER TO THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT WAS 
APPROPRIATE. 
Stack appears to argue that the post-conviction court also should have ruled on his 
claims against the Board of Pardons & Parole. However, the court correctly concluded 
that the proper place for those allegations to be adjudicated was in the Third District 
Court. Stack is incarcerated within the geographic jurisdiction of the Third District Court 
and the Board is located within it. The court was simply applying normal rules of venue. 
Stack has not even been harmed by this order. The court did not dismiss it, but merely 
directed it to a different court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-2(2) (1996) states that venue is 
proper in the county in which the action arose. Because the Board is located in Salt Lake 
County, the orders Stack challenges occurred in that county and venue was appropriate in 
that forum. 
The post-conviction court also applied language in a parallel provision of rule 65B, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning wrongful restraints on personal liberty (R. 
650). Subparagraph (b)(2) directs that petitions be commenced by filing a petition "in the 
district in which the petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or in which the 
alleged restraint is occurring." Although Stack claimed relief under rule 65B(d), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which does not have a venue provision, applying subparagraph 
6 
(b)(2) is reasonable. In any event, since the post-conviction court did not dismiss the 
petition, the Third District Court can still review. Stack has not been harmed by the 
transfer order. Cf. Utah R.Crim.P. 30(1) (errors that do not affect substantial rights 
should be disregarded). 
CONCLUSION 
The post-conviction court's order denying post-conviction relief and ordering 
transfer of the remainder of the petition should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS (£__ September 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
7 
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PETITION FOR WRIT FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
\s Question not applicable since this claim concerns a Board 
of Pardons action for which there is no appeal or 
administrative remedy. 
6. I have previously filed a Petition for Writ of 
Extraordinary Relief: 
Yes W ^ N c 
7. Petitioner requests that he be appointed legal counsel 
based on the attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity. 
8. The following documents are attached nereto and 
incorporated herein by reference (check all that apply): 
\ ^ An affidavit of impecuniosity and certificate from the 
Inmate Accounting Office,, if you are requesting a waiver 
of the filing fee, 
[^ Affidavits that support Petitioner's allegations 
^ Copies of records that support Petitioner's allegations, 
i ^ Other evidence that supports Petitioner's allegations 
Copies of pleadings, orders and memoranda in any prior 
proceeding dealing with these issues. 
9. Petitioner was unable to obtain and attach the following 
documents because (list the efforts you made to obtain the 
documents and the results of your efforts): //?#&5c/?/p/5 O-f/wh 
l9H ,nd /99l/ J>4fo/c A^/p^3, 3: / W /?ea^s^ i/v,^ Sewal Hme* 
A'/ /we h&AJ J~J<J JZAais't re sa* /£/? //v/» . Jla^ >.K>J,y?A>+> 
10. That pursuant to URCP Rules 6 58(b)(3) and 6 5B(d) as 
appropriate, Petitioner requests that this Court order the 
5 Revised 7/96 
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Respondent to obtain such transcripts of proceedings or records 
which are relevant and material to this case and requests that the 
responsible county/Administrative Agency be directed to pay the 
costs of the proceeding. (See attached motion and affidavit of 
impecuniosity). 
11. _t_^This action has been filed under Rule 65B(b) or Rule 
653(d). Therefore, the four vear statute of limitations 
set forth in UCA Sec. 78rT2>::T57^ " ~-"^ " 
This action has been filed beyond the applicable statute 
of limitations because of the following reasons: 
A/A 
Petitioner asks this court to find that the interest of 
justice require the court to excuse Petitioner's failure 
to file within the time limitations. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court: 
1. Schedule an evidentiary hearing at which time Petitioner 
may be present and represented by counsel. 
2. Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed 
without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments. 
3. Order Respondent to provide transcripts of records of 
proceedings vvhich are relevant to this cause of action. 
4. Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in 
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PETITION FOR WRIT FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in 
the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above. 
5. Issue an Order for Extraordinary Relief to have the 
Petitioner brought before it, to the end that the illegal activity 
of the Respondent be terminated. (s&L eXkck^ K ^ ^ F A i 4 o ) 
6. Other relief requested iTAa/ Ag W v / V / / A W / w / » f C/A 
^L
 ; 





Attorney Pro Se 
PETITIONER'S VERIFICATION UNDER OATH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
k /li / J 
COUNTY OF 
ss 
I the undersigned petitioner, declare under penalty of perjury 




n SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before <2~}~- day of 
NOTARY/PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: £? ^ D ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH 
Commsvon ExpirM 
Juno 6 2000 
DELYNNSUMMERS 
PO Box 250 
Draper, UuD WvlU 
Revised 7/96 
ADDENDUMB 
••Oy 1 2 1997 
DISTRICT COURT, GARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH 
55 South Main 
Panguitch, UT 84759 
Telephone: 435-676-1104 Fax: 435-676-8239 
BRIAN K. STACK, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS, MICHAEL 
SIBBETT, HANK GALETKA, Warden, 
UTAH STATE PRISON, .; 
Respondents. 
1 ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR 
| POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND 
I RETURNING VENUE TO SALT LAKE 
COUNTY FOR CONSIDERATION OF 
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
RELIEF 
Case No. 970600017 CV 
Assigned Judge: K. L. McIFF 
The petitioner's pleadings have been interpreted as seeking post conviction relief under 
Rule 65C and extraordinary relief under Rule 65B(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
petitioner is presently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. In order to put his claims in context 
the Court has set forth a brief statement of historical facts leading to petitioner's conviction and 
imprisonment followed by procedural facts resulting in the matter being lodged with this court. 
HISTORICAL FACTS 
The chain of events which led to petitioner's ultimate conviction and imprisonment started 
with a stolen vehicle and several "gas-skips" where petitioner fueled the vehicle at retail gas 
outlets and then left without paying. The final such gas-skip occurred at Cove Fort, Utah. The 
incident was reported and officers in the field were alerted. Trooper Lynn Pierson of the Utah 
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Highway Patrol heard the bulletin and stopped the petitioner on a lonely stretch of road in 
Garfield County. As the officer approached the petitioners's vehicle the petitioner stuck a gun 
out the window and fired at the officer. An exchange of gun-fire followed. Petitioner claims not 
to have aimed, but was successful in inflicting a mortal wound. A passer-by discovered the fallen 
trooper and used the latter's radio to summons help. Word went out over the air and after a high 
speed chase the petitioner was apprehended and charged with first degree murder, a capital 
offense. 
On July 19, 1979, the petitioner appeared before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge of 
the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Garfield County. The county attorney, Russell Mahan, 
and the petitioners's lawyer, Ronald Yengich, advised the Court that a plea bargain had been 
reached. This colloquy followed: 
THE COURT: I'd like to hear what the plea bargain is. Mr. Stack, 
you listen to this carefully and I'd like to hear from the State of Utah and then 
from the defense. 
MR. MAHAN: Your Honor, the plea bargaining [sic] position is 
this: That Mr. Stack would plead guilty to First Degree Murder, the State of 
Utah through the Garfield County Attorney, myself, would not then recommend 
the death penalty. 
THE COURT: Is that the plea bargain, Counsel? 
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MR. YENGICH: That satisfactorily sums up the plea negotiations in 
this case with the understanding, as Mr. Mahan has indicated, that the State of 
Utah, upon the entry of a guilty plea and its acceptance by the Court, would not, at 
a mitigation hearing, recommend the death penalty in this particular matter. 
THE COURT: That's the way I understand your statement, Mr. 
Mahan. 
MR. MAHAN: Yes, I would agree with what Mr. Yengich said. 
THE COURT: Alright. Mr. Stack, is that your understanding of the 
plea negotiations? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. (Transcript of Proceedings, July 19, 1979, p. 13, 
14) 
Pursuant to this plea bargain, the petitioner entered a plea of guilty to first degree murder, 
a capital offense. A hearing for the purpose of determining the penalty was conducted on the 4th 
day of September, 1979, before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs. The State did not call any 
witnesses but reiterated its agreement that it would not recommend the death penalty. The 
defense filed affidavits and called several witnesses prefacing the same with this observation in its 
opening statement, 
MR. YENGICH: ". . . All and all, when all of the evidence has been 
produced before the Court, we will submit to the Court that the appropriate 
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penalty to be imposed in this particular matter is the penalty of life imprisonment as 
opposed to the death penalty. . . ." (Transcript of Proceedings, Sept. 4, 1979, p 8.) 
The evidence presented and the arguments made at the penalty phase hearing centered upon the 
issue of life or death. The petitioner testified personally and his counsel put the issue squarely 
before him. 
MR. YENGICH: Do you realize, Brian, if the Judge did not impose 
the death penalty, you could be in prison the rest of your life? 
MR. STACK: Yes. 
MR. YENGICH: And do you feel you would still prefer that to the 
death penalty? 
MR. STACK: Yes, I would, because I would still have my life, you 
know. I would be locked up but I could work there. (Transcript of Proceedings, 
Sept. 4, 1979, p. 76, 77.) 
In pleading for his client's life, defense counsel offered: 
MR. YENGICH: ". . . He will spend the remainder of his days in 
prison. He will see the twilight of his life in prison, just as he's seen the morning 
of his life roaming around the country with no apparent purpose and receiving 
beatings in the hands of his loved ones. He will see the twilight of his life in prison 
and that is punishment enough. 
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"Mr. Stack, Sr., [the petitioner's father] says that in his affidavit. He says 
it will be punishment enough that this young man stay behind bars for the rest of 
his life. I suggest to the Court that that is a grave punishment and it would be to 
me and I'm sure it would be for the Court. 
" . . . Brian Keith Stack's life is not . . . open ended. The future will be all bad. 
His future is a closed one and it will be closed within the four walls of the Utah 
State Prison but he says to the Court and he says as best he can, 'Your Honor, I 
do want to live. I don't want the death penalty, even though I may spend the rest 
of my life in prison,' and I think that says something for the young man because 
it might be the easier thing for him to accept the ultimate sentence." (Transcript of 
Proceedings, Sept. 4, 1979, p. 92, 93.) 
At the conclusion of the hearing and after making some preliminary comments,1 the 
District Judge stated simply: 
JUDGE TIBBS: ". . . In view of all those factors, it is the Order of 
this Court, Mr. Brian Keith Stack, that you be sentenced to life imprisonment in 
the Utah State Prison." (Transcript of Proceedings, Sept. 4, 1979, p. 96.) 
It is these preliminary comments on which the petitioner places reliance. They are appended to his 
petition for extraordinary relief. The sentencing judge encouraged the petitioner to enter prison with the right attitude, 
avoid trouble and seek an education. He stated petitioner still had the possibility of a good life. From these very general 
comments petitioner seeks to compel the board of pardons to release him so that he can "have a good life". See the 
prayer of the petition set forth infra under the area labeled "The Present Action". 
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The written order prepared for execution by the Court included reference to an 
"indeterminate" sentence. The word "indeterminate" was stricken by the judge and initialed. The 
signed document as modified stated simply, "IT IS THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that Brian 
Keith Stack be committed to the Utah State Prison for a sentence of life imprisonment." A copy 
of the Judgment and Commitment Order is attached hereto. 
PROCEDURAL FACTS 
Notwithstanding petitioner's sentence to a determinate term of life in prison, he has been 
given audience before the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole on multiple occasions2. The first 
occurred on September 3, 1980 when the board denied his application for parole and ordered a 
re- hearing for September 1985. The second hearing did not go forward as scheduled because the 
petitioner had been transferred to federal custody; however, at the request of the parole board, 
the federal authorities conducted a courtesy hearing.3 On April 30, 1986, the petitioner again 
appeared before the parole board which declined parole but granted a re-hearing for September 
1994. Petitioner's last hearing before the parole board occurred September 16, 1994 at which 
time the board took the matter under advisement and issued a decision granting the petitioner a 
It does not appear that the petitioner has received any less attention by the board than would have 
been the case if the court had not omitted the reference to an "indeterminate" sentence. 
The petitioner claims that he refused this hearing and that it should have no bearing on his petition for 
extraordinary relief. His focus is limited to the two subsequent hearings. 
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re-hearing in January 2014. The board supported its last decision with a written rational 
indicating the factors upon which it relied. 
THE PRESENT ACTION 
On April 3, 1997, petitioner filed this action in the Third District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County. His petition is styled "Petition for Extraordinary Relief, and specifically 
references Rule 65B (d). The prayer of the petition, however, not only asks for extraordinary 
relief but also seems to seek "post-conviction relief which under the recently amended rules is 
governed by Rule 65C. The petitioner prays: 
(1) That the court vacate and set aside petitioner's guilty plea. 
(2) That the court remand this case back to district court for re-sentencing within the 
fifteen (15) to twenty-five (25) year range. 
(3) That the court order the B.P.P. [board of pardons and parole] to recognize 
petitioners plea bargain and Judge Tibbs' wishes, that he be released to have a 
good life. 
(4) That the court rule that the B.P.P. and parole has no jurisdiction over 
petitioner's release. 
(5) Order immediate release of petitioner. 
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VENUE 
Apparently owing to the nature of the requested relief and notwithstanding the clear 
reference by the petitioner to Rule 65B (d) on which he was relying, the Attorney General's 
Office filed a Motion for Change of Venue to the Sixth District Court for Garfield County where 
petitioner had originally been sentenced. The motion was filed with a copy mailed to the 
defendant on May 2, 1997. On May 5 and before the petitioner had an opportunity to respond, an 
order changing the venue was signed and filed. Immediately thereafter (May 7, 1997) the 
petitioner filed an "Opposition to the Motion for Change of Venue,''claiming that his 
documentation had been misunderstood. He asked that the motion for change of venue be 
rejected for the reason that "petitioner is not challenging his commitment from the Sixth District 
Court." 
The petitioner went on to state that he was relying on Rule 65B (d) [extraordinary relief] 
and that he was specifically challenging the board of pardon's hearings which took place 
respectively on April 30, 1986 and September 16, 1994. He urged "that the respondent's 
attorneys had made an error and mistake in their interpretation of his writ". A few days later the 
petitioner authored a second document entitled " Motion and Order in Opposition to Change of 
Venue" in which he asked the Court to return the case to the Third District alleging that "plaintiff 
has misinterpreted a Rule 65B (d) [extraordinary writ] brought against the State of Utah Board of 
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Pardons, which is a civil matter, with that of a 65C post-conviction action. Petitioner included in 
his hand-written document a proposed order returning the matter to the Third District. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are clear regarding the matter of venue If the 
petitioner seeks extraordinary relief under Rule 65B (d) it is to be filed in the district in which the 
petitioner is restrained, i.e., the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County. If it is post-
conviction relief under Rule 65C which is sought, then the petition is to be filed with the district 
in the county in which the judgement of conviction was entered, i.e., the Sixth District Court in 
and for Garfield County. 
After thoughtful review this Court has determined to limit its review to the issue of post-
conviction relief under Rule 65 and then return the matter to the Third District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County for consideration of the extraordinary relief which the petitioner claims he is 
seeking. 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, UNDER RULE 65C 
As noted above, the petitioner initially stated that he was not challenging his commitment 
from the Sixth District Court. The State, however, through separate counsel, moved to dismiss 
that part of the petition which in reality seeks post-conviction relief and both sides set forth their 
respective positions in memoranda which followed. The issue has been fairly put to the Court and 
deserves a response without being shuttled back and forth or delayed by procedural maneuvering. 
To the extent that petitioner seeks post-convictions relief under Rule 65C, it can not survive the 
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bar created by the petitioner's failure to pursue a direct appeal of his sentence. Gerrish v. Barnes. 
844 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah 1992); Hurst v. CooL 777P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989); Codianna 
v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101,1104 (Utah 1983). If the sentence which the petitioner received, 
which is clear on its face, does not comport with the plea bargain which he thinks was reached, 
then an appeal should have been filed and the failure to do so, absent some unusual circumstances, 
none of which have been shown, bars any post-conviction relief under Rule 65C. IdL Some 
eighteen years have expired since the petitioner was sentenced. Allowance of a collateral attack 
at this stage would require a strong showing that it would be "unconscionable not to reexamine" 
the proceedings which led to the petitioner's sen:ence. See Gerrish at 1035, relying upon 
Codianna at 1115. Petitioner has neither suggested nor shown anything that would remotely 
approach the level of being unconscionable. 
OTHER PENDING MOTIONS 
Petitioner has filed an expansive number of motions which are subsidiary to the two 
primary areas of requested relief, i.e., post-conviction relief under Rule 65C and extraordinary 
relief under Rule 65B(d). These include motions to appoint pro bono counsel, allow discovery, 
provide a law library, amend pleadings, strike pleadings, strike a state exhibit, hold hearings and 
grant extensions of time for various purposes. 
This court has considered all of these. The venue issue has been fairly raised and resolved 
The other motions have varying degrees of relevance to the limited issues being^ddressed by this 
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court. Moreover, and more importantly, the court concludes that the requested post-conviction 
relief would not be aided by counsel, law library, amendment,4 additional discovery, striking an 
exhibit, granting extensions of time or holding hearings. Accordingly, the various motions as 
applied to the request for post-conviction relief are denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The petitioner's request for post-conviction relief under Rule 65C, to the extent that it 
may be so characterized, is dismissed with prejudice, as a matter of law, based upon the failure tc 
pursue a direct appeal, and the case is returned to the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County for consideration of the petitioners claim for relief under Rule 65B (d). 
It is abundantly clear from the pleadings that the petitioner was surprised by the re-
characterization of his petition and the consequent and immediate change of venue. Whether the 
petitioner's request for relief under Rule 65B (d) can rise any higher than his failed request for 
relief under Rule 65C is not for this Court to say. In fairness, however, it should be heard where 
such actions are properly lodged and where petitioner intended, to-wit, the district in which he is 
incarcerated. 
The clerk is directed to return the file to the Honorable David S. Young of the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County. 
Where a proposed amended pleading has been filed, the court has considered the content thereof as 
though its filing had been approved. 
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Dated this fZO day of October, 1997. 
K. L. Mc 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On October 30 , 1997 a copy of the above Order Denying Request for Post-Conviction 
Relief and Returning Venue to Salt Lake County for Consideration of Petition for Extraordinary 
Relief was sent to each of the following by the method indicated: 
Addressee Method (M=mafl. P=in person. F=Fix) Addressee Method (M=mail P=in person, F=Fix) 
Brian K. Stack #14708 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
Angela F. Micklos 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140854 
160 E. 300 S. 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
[m] Lorenzo Miller 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 
[m] Honorable David S. Young 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 





Russell L. Mahan 
Garfiel * "ounty Attorney 
55 Sou; .ain —/A 
Panguitch, Utah 8^759 - ^ ' /'<d-l' 'J/H 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : Criminal No. 272*1 
vs. : 
BRIAN KEITH STACK, : JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
Defendant. FIRST DEGREE MURDER 
This matter came on for Sentence Hearing pursuant to 
Section 76-3-207 U.C.A. 3953, as amended, on Tuesday, 
September 4, 1979, at 10 a.m. At an earlier hearing, on 
July 19, 1979, the Defendant, Brian Keith* Stack, plead 
guilty to First Degree Murder under Section 76-5-2Q2(e) 
Ucah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, as charged in the 
Information filed herein, which plea was then accepted 
by the above-captloned Court. The State of Utah was 
represented by the Garfield County Attorney, Russell L. 
Mahan. The Defendant was present personally and was 
represented by his attorneys, Mr. Ronald J. Yengich and 
Mr. 0. Brenton Rowe. Witnesses were heard, and the Court, 
being fulled advised in the premises, imposed the setence. 
IT IS THE FINDING OF THIS COURT that Brian Keitch 
Stack is guilty of FIRST DEGREE MURDER, as charged. 
IT IS THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that Brian Keith Stack 
be committed to the Utah State Prison for a»> 
sentence of life imprisonment. 
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THIS COURT that the Garfield 
County Sheriff take Brian Keith Stack to the Utah State 
Prison for the carrying out of this sentence. 
